The question of intercreditor equity is one of the most contentious issues in debt restructuring, both historically and today.
Intercreditor Equity in Sovereign Debt Restructuring maps and establishes the content of these intercreditor equity rules, and analyses how they influence the restructuring process. Through this analysis, Astrid Iversen outlines how creditors can predict their legal rights in the unfortunate event of a debt restructuring and strives to improve our understanding of the boundaries within which a debt restructuring offer must be designed. Iversen also seeks to shed light on the functioning of the legal framework governing sovereign debt more broadly. In this book, she examines whether intercreditor equity rules and the legal framework of sovereign debt are compatible with a debtor state's responsibility to ensure monetary and financial stability and to establish sustainable debt burdens. Iversen also explores how certain intercreditor equity rules constitute an obstacle to sustainable debt restructurings and highlights how the number of different intercreditor equity rules that a sovereign debtor state typically is bound by, as well as the scope of these rules, risk tightening the policy space of debtor states to the extent that it is difficult to design and implement a sustainable debt restructuring.
Suitable as an introductory text for readers new to the topic of sovereign debt restructurings, and as an instructive guide for debt management offices, creditors, and their lawyers, this publication provides a comprehensive legal study of intercreditor equity rules in sovereign debt restructuring.
- First book to comprehensively explore intercreditor equity rules in sovereign debt restructurings
- Provides an up-to-date analysis of relevant contract clauses, statutory law, and international law, including practice from the European Court of Human Rights and International Investment Tribunals
- Instructive aid for debtor states, their debt management offices, and lawyers
- Discusses shortcomings in the existing sovereign debt regime and provides suggestions for changes to the broader regulatory framework
