Addressing both scholars of international law and political science as well as decision makers involved in cybersecurity policy, the book tackles the most important and intricate legal issues that a State faces when considering a reaction to a malicious cyber operation conducted by an adversarial State. While often invoked in political debates and widely analysed in international legal scholarship, self-defence and countermeasures will often remain unavailable to states in situations of cyber emergency due to the pervasive problem of reliable and timely attribution of cyber operations to State actors. Analysing the legal questions surrounding attribution in detail, the book presents the necessity defence as an evidently available alternative. However, the shortcomings of the doctrine as based in customary international law that render it problematic as a remedy for states are examined in-depth. In light of this, the book concludes by outlining a special emergency regime for cyberspace.
- Addresses the attribution problem in cyberspace from a legal perspective with a comprehensive, novel scope. This study closes a gap for both legal and political science scholarship, as well as policymakers, enabling them to make sense of the attribution problem
- Focuses on unilateral remedies to cyber operations in order to tackle the legal questions most pressing for States
- Instead of abstract analysis, the book bases its examination on real-world examples and concludes with a concrete proposal for future regulation of State conduct in cyberspace, providing useful insights for both academic and political spheres
