

IDC	Inter Digital Inc.
IP	Intellectual property
ISO	Insurance Services Office
IT	Information technology
LCD	Liquid crystal display
MFA	McCarran-Ferguson Act
MOFCOM	Ministry of Commerce
MRP	Minimum resale price
NDRC	National Development and Reform Commission
NPC	National People's Congress
OFCA	Office of Communications Authority
OFTA	Office of the Telecommunication Authority
RPM	Resale price maintenance
SAIC	State Administration for Industry and Commerce
SLC	Significant lessening of competition
SSNIP	Significant and Non-Transitory Increase in Price
VIE	Variable interest entity
WTO	World Trade Organization

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