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## Preface to the Seventh Edition

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Much has happened since the sixth edition. Eleven Supreme Court antitrust cases have been decided, some overturning existing doctrine and others refining it. *Leegin*, in particular, completed the rule-of-reason revolution with respect to vertical distribution<sup>8</sup> restraints, taking resale price maintenance out of the per se rule. In June 2013, the Supreme Court decided *Actavis*, providing that reverse payment settlements are subject to antitrust scrutiny. In addition to incorporating these and other Supreme Court cases, we have added two circuit court decisions on bundled discounts and loyalty discounts: *Le Page's* and *Peace Health*. Also of note is that we have included the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines and the *H&R Block* case, which applies the new Guidelines and nicely illustrates the analysis of differentiated product markets in mergers. The book has been updated throughout. As in previous editions, the book pays special attention to the intersection of antitrust and intellectual property law.

We are grateful to our many colleagues around the world who have contributed to our understanding of industrial organization and antitrust. We want to particularly thank Professor Jonathan Rose for comments on the sixth edition.

With this edition we introduce a new tradition of thanking research assistants who made significant contributions to the current edition. With apologies to any we have inadvertently omitted, we thank Meaghan Banks, Norma Cerros, Jake Feltham, Omari French, and Nadezhda Nikonova.

Finally, and most of all, we wish to thank our wives, Jody and Jenn; our children Leah, Irene, Cole, and Adam; and the rest of our families for all their love.

L.K. and A.E.

June 2013

Disclaimers: Louis Kaplow and Aaron Edlin occasionally consult on antitrust matters for government agencies and private parties. Louis Kaplow's wife is in the legal department of a financial services firm.